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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007TAC Market Design
competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the com-
petition, and uses this classification to compare these entries. The
paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auctionrules
adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via aset of
post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the pap r
speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both
in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence ]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence:
Multiagent systems
General Terms
Design, Economics, Experimentation, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Double auction, mechanism design, trading agent competition
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the Trading Agent Competition
(TAC) Market Design competition, a competition known asCAT. A
CAT game consists of a set of agents. Each of these is either a buyer,
a seller, or a specialist. Each specialist operates and setsthe rules
for a single exchange market, a double auction, and buyers and ell-
ers — collectively calledtraders— trade in one of the available
markets. Buyers and sellers make offers to trade, known asshouts,
and specialists identify compatible traders, and thencl ar the mar-
kets. In theCAT competition, the traders are provided by the game
organizers, and use standard trading strategies from the literature.
While entrants know what strategies may be used, they are nottold
the precise makeup of the trader population. Specialists, and hence
the rules of the markets, are designed by the entrants.1 A typical
1This is the reverse of the otherTAC games, hence the nameCAT.
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CAT game consists of aCAT server and severalCAT clients, which
may be traders or specialists.CAT clients do not talk to each other
directly; instead they connect to theCAT server through sockets and
the server responds to messages from clients and forwards informa-
tion if needed. A plain-text-based protocol calledCATP, similar to
HTTP, regulates the communication between theCAT server and the
clients.
A CAT game lasts a certain number ofdays, each day consists of
rounds, and each round lasts a certain number ofticks, or millisec-
onds. Trading is only permitted during rounds, and hence during
a day. After a day closes, information on the profit made by each
specialist and the number of traders registered with it are disclosed.
This allows specialists to change their market rules, adapting these
rules to improve their competitiveness. Between days traders may
change the specialist that they trade with, and they migrateto spe-
cialists that allow more profitable trades [11].
Specialists make a profit by charging traders. They are allowed
to charge traders a fee for registering to trade with them on agiven
day, for placing a shout, for obtaining information on the shouts
made by other traders, for making a transaction, and they may
charge a fraction of the bid/ask spread at a transaction (which we
call theprofit fee). In the first competition, in 2007, specialists were
rated by a combination of the profit they made on specificassess-
ment days, the market share they obtained on those days, and the
success rate of transactions on those days.2
2. COMPONENTS OF SPECIALISTS
A specialist may adopt various auction rules.JCAT, the software
platform that supports theCAT games [7], provides a reference im-
plementation of a parameterizable specialist that can be easily con-
figured and extended to use policies regulating different aspect of
an auction. This section briefly describes a classification of th se
aspects that we have derived from the policies provided byJCAT
and those used by specialists in the 2007 tournament. This clas i-
fication is an extension of the parametric model of [14]. Section 3
relates these policies to theCAT 2007 finalists.
2.1 Matching policy
Matching policies define how a market matches shouts made by
traders. Equilibrium matching(ME) is the most commonly used
matching policy [9, 13]. The offers made by traders form there-
ported demand and supply, which is usually different from theun-
derlying demand and supply, and are determined by traders’ private
values and unknown to the specialist, since traders are assumed
to be profit-seeking and make offers deviating from their private
2More information may be found atwww.marketbasedcontrol.comand in [4].
values. ME clears the market at thereported equilibrium price
and matches intra-marginal asks (offers to sell) with intra-m rginal
bids (offers to buy) — with an intersecting demand and supply, the
shouts on the left of the intersection (the equilibrium point) and
their traders are calledintra-marginal since they can be matched
and make profit, while those on the right are calledextra-marginal.
It is worth mentioning that a shout, or a trader, that appearsto be
intra-marginal or extra-marginal in the reported demand and supply
may not be so in the underlying demand and supply.Max-volume
matching(MV) aims to increase transaction volume based on the
observation that a high intra-marginal bid can match with a lower
extra-marginal ask, though with a profit loss for the buyer.
2.2 Quote policy
Quote policies determine the quotes issued by markets. Typi-
cal quotes are the ask and bid quotes, which respectively specify
the upper bound for asks and the lower bound for bids that may be
placed in aquote-drivenmarket.Two-sided quoting3 (QT) defines
the ask quote as the minimum of the lowest tentatively matchable
bid and lowest unmatchable ask, and defines the bid quote as the
the maximum of the highest tentatively matchable ask and highest
unmatchable bid.One-sided quoting(QO) is similar toQT, but con-
siders only the standing shouts closest to the reported equilibri m
price from the unmatchable side. When the market is cleared con-
tinuously (see below),QO is identical toQT, but otherwise forms a
possibly looser restriction on placing shouts.
2.3 Shout accepting policy
Shout accepting policies judge whether a shout made by a trader
should be permitted in the market.Always accepting(AA) ac-
cepts any shout.Quote-beating accepting(AQ) allows only those
shouts more competitive than the corresponding market quote. This
has been commonly used in both experimental settings and real
stock markets, and is sometimes called the “New York Stock Ex-
change rule” since that market adopts it.Equilibrium-beating ac-
cepting(AE) learns an estimate of the equilibrium price based on
the past transaction prices in a sliding window, and requires bids
to be higher than the estimate and asks to be lower. This policy
was suggested in [10] and found to be effective in reducing trans-
action price fluctuation and increasing allocative efficieny in mar-
kets populated withZI-C traders [6]. Self-beating accepting(AS)
accepts all first-time shouts but only allows a trader to modify its
standing shout with a more competitive price.Transaction-based
accepting(AT) tracks the most recently matched asks and bids, and
uses the lowest matched bid and the highest matched ask to re-
strict the shouts to be accepted. In a clearing house (CH) [3], the
two bounds are expected to be close to the estimate of equilibri m
price in AE, while in a continuous double auction (CDA), AT may
produce much looser restriction since extra-marginal shouts may
steal a deal.History-based accepting(AH) is derived from theGD
trading strategy [5].GD computes how likely a given offer is to
be matched, based on the history of previous shouts, andAH uses
this to accept only shouts that will be matched with probability no
lower than a specified threshold.
2.4 Clearing condition
Clearing conditions define when to clear the market and execute
transactions between matched asks and bids.Continuous clearing
(CC) attempts to clear the market whenever a new shout is placed.
Round clearing(CR) clears the market after all traders have sub-
mitted their shouts.
3The name follows [9] since either quote depends on information on both the ask side
and the bid side.
2.5 Pricing policy
A pricing policy is responsible for determining transaction prices
for matched ask-bid pairs. The decision making may involve only
the prices of the matched ask and bid, or more information includ-
ing market quotes.Discriminatoryk-pricing (PD) sets the trans-
action price of a matched ask-bid pair at some point in the interval
between their prices. The parameterk ∈ [0, 1] controls which point
is used and usually takes value0.5 to avoid a bias in favor of buy-
ers or sellers.Uniform k-pricing (PU) is similar to PD, but sets
the transaction prices for all matched ask-bid pairs at samepoint
between the ask quote and the bid quote.PU cannot be used with
MV because the price intervals of some matched ask-bid pairs do
not cover the spread between the ask quote and the bid quote.n-
pricing (PN) was introduced in [10], and sets the transaction price
as the average of the latestn pairs of matched asks and bids. If
the average falls out of the price interval between the ask and bid
to be matched, the nearest end of the interval is used. This policy
can help reduce transaction price fluctuation and has littleimpact
on allocative efficiency.Side-biased pricing(PB) is basicallyPD
with k set to split the profit in favor of the side on which fewer
shouts exist. Thus the more that asks outnumber bids in the curr nt
market, the closerk is set to 0.
2.6 Charging policy
Charging policies determine how charges are imposed by a spe-
cialist. Fixed charging(GF) sets charges at a specified fixed level.
Bait-and-switch charging(GB) makes a specialist cut its charges
until it captures a certain market share, and then slowly increases
charges to increase profit. It will adjust its charges downward again
if its market share drops below a certain level.Charge-cutting
charging(GC) sets the charges by scaling down the lowest charges
of markets imposed on the previous day. This is based on the ob-
servation that traders all prefer markets with lower charges. L arn-
or-lure-fast charging(GL) adapts charges towards some target fol-
lowing the scheme used by theZIP trading strategy [1].
3. SPECIALISTS IN THE 2007 FINALS
The firstCAT competition was held in conjunction withAAAI in
July 2007. Table 1 lists the finalists in descending order of their
final rankings4 and identifies the auction rules we inferred from the
programs of theCAT 2007 competition final (held in theTAC repos-
itory) against the policies we described in Section 2. All specialists
for which we have data fit into the generic double auction mecha-
nism framework introduced above and Table 1.
We found that most specialists useME to clear markets at the
equilibrium price. IAMwildCAT andMertacor are the only two
attempting to match competitive intra-marginal shouts with extra-
marginal shouts close to the equilibrium point in order to obtain
high transaction success rates.QT, familiar from classicCDAs and
CHs, is a popular quote policy, but its effectiveness is bound to
the matching policy that is used with it since different matching
algorithms, such asME andMV, can generate significantly varying
quotes. Furthermore, quote policies only affect the performance of
the specialists whenAQ is used as an accepting policy.
Specialists use a wide range of shout accepting policies, which
reflects the importance of this aspect in performing well inCAT
games. In contrast, onlyCrocodileAgent andMertacor use a
clearing condition that isn’t one of the standard policies provided in
4Due to technical problems, two teams,TacTex and MANX, were not able
to participate in all the games. Some teams were banned from parts of
some games —PSUCAT and Havana for exceeding reconnection limits, and
CrocodileAgent,Havana,MANX,PSUCAT,TacTex, andjackaroo
for invalid fees.
Table 1: Comparison between theCAT 2007 finalists.
specialists matching quote accepting clearing pricing charging
IAMwildCAT ME+MV∗ QT + QO + ∆ AQ+AE+AS+∆ CR PB∗ ∆
PSUCAT ME (QT) AE∗ CC PB∗ ∆
CrocodileAgent ME (QT + QO∗) AE CR∗ PN∗+PB∗ GL∗
jackaroo ME QT∗ AQ CC PN GC∗+∆
Havana ME∗ QT AQ CC PD ∆
PersianCat ME∗ (QT) AT∗+∆ CC PD GF∗+∆
PhantAgent
Mertacor MV∗ (QT) AE∗ CR∗ PB∗ ∆
TacTex ME (QT) AA CR PD GB∗+GC∗
MANX ME QT AQ CR PD GC∗+GL∗
XX∗ denotes a policy that can be viewed as a modified or improvedXX ; ∆ stands for some mechanism that cannot be related
to any policy in Section 2;(XX) represents a quote policy that is defined by the specialist but has no effect on its behavior due
to its adoption of some non-AQ accepting policy; andXX + YY means some combination ofXX andYY. Blanks are left due
to lack of information —PhantAgent is not in theTAC repository.
JCAT. SinceJCAT ensures that specialists impose uniform charges
on all traders registered with it on a trading day, it is not possible
to attract specific traders by levying differential charges. However,
about half the entrants managed to bias their pricing policyto pro-
mote the quality of their trader population.
Entrants seem to have contributed more effort to charging poli-
cies than to any other aspect of auction mechanisms. Table 2 in
particular compares:
1. How charges are updated over time.
Some specialistsadapt their charges while othersdirectly
calculatethe charges that they expect to bring a certain pay-
off without explicitly considering how they charge currently.
A third choice is to combine the two approaches by setting
charges that movegraduallyfrom the current level to the tar-
get level.
2. Whether different types of charges are treated differently.
About half of the specialists impose only or mainly registra-
tion fees and charges on profits.TacTex charges only shout
fees. All the three specialists without a bias towards a cer-
tain kind of fee —CrocodileAgent, Havana andMANX —
adapt charges without using any heuristic knowledge of the
fee types.
3. Whether traders are identified and treated differentially.
Only IAMwildCAT tracks individual traders and records in-
formation on them.
4. How much profit a trader and/or a specialist can make on
average.
IAMwildCAT andjackaroo are the only two specialists that
lay down a road map for achieving some desired or target
profit. IAMwildCAT is the only one that tracks the absolute
value of the daily overall profit of specialists, which, when
small, can be exploited by the specialist to obtain a fairly
high share of the profit without imposing massive fees.
5. Whether a specialist learns from the history of charges and
performances of its own and/or the other specialists.
It is a common practice among the specialists for fees to be
set based on information about their competitors’ charges
and performances, though the lengths of history monitored
vary from only the previous day, to a sliding multi-day win-
dow, to the full game history.
6. Whether a specialist tries to lure traders by charging less in
the early stage of a game (start effect) and/or imposes higher
charges when the game is about to end (deadline effect).
Most specialists feature start and deadline effects, taking ad-
vantage of a definitive game duration and traders exploring
widely at the beginning of aCAT game.
The characterization of the specialists in Table 2 may help establish
the relationship between the features of auction rules and their per-
formances, and guide appropriate modification of an auctionmech-
anism to achieve desirable behavior.
4. EXPERIMENTS WITH THE FINALISTS
To further examine the strategies of the specialists that partici-
pated in theCAT 2007 competition, we ran a series of games with
the same setup as in the 2007 finals.
4.1 Experimental setup
Every game in our experiment ran for 500 trading days with 10
rounds per day and 1 second per round. The trader population com-
prised 180ZIP traders [1], 180RE traders [2], 20ZI-C traders [6],
and 20GD traders [5]. Buyers and sellers were evenly split in each
trader sub-population. The private values of all the traders were
independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 50and
150, and each trader was allowed to buy or sell up to 3 commodi-
ties per day. The specialists in our games included all 8 specialists
released on theTAC web site’s agent repository. The same scoring
criteria were used as in the tournament [4] but, unlike the tourna-
ment, all the game days were assessed. The results and plots shown
5PSUCAT however does identify traders to adjust parameters in its pricing policy.






profitability fee history score history start
effect
deadline
effecttraders specialists self others self others
IAMwildCAT ⇒◦ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ❙ ❙   ✓ ✓
PSUCAT ◦⇒ ✓ ✗5 ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ✓ ✓
CrocodileAgent ◦⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗     ✓ ✗
jackaroo ⇒◦ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ✓ ✓
Havana ⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗     ✓ ✗
PersianCat ◦⇒ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ✗ ❙ ✗ ✓ ✓
PhantAgent
Mertacor ⇒◦ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ b ❙ b ✓ ✓
TacTex ◦⇒ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙ b b ✓ ✗
MANX ⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙   ✗ ✗
✓ has this feature ✗ does not have this feature  sliding window ❙ single dayb full history ◦⇒ adapting ⇒◦ direct calculation ◦⇒◦ gradual learning









Table 3: The scores of specialists in our experiments.Havana relies
on the CPLEX library, and since at the time of writing we do not
have a licence for CPLEX, we were unable to include it in our
experiments.
in the following sections were averaged over a total of 10 games.
To obtain a clearer view, plots were smoothed out with each datum
being the average of a 10-day sliding window around it.
4.2 Winners
The results of our experiments broadly agree with the rankings
in the tournament [12]. The 2007CAT champion,IAMwildCAT,
still wins in our experiments andPSUCAT, which placed second
in the competition, comes second as shown in Table 3. The only
changes in ranking are due toTacTex andMANX increasing their
scores since they could participate in every game. Figure 1 show
the daily components of the scores and Figure 2 shows some of th
daily charges made by the specialists.
4.3 Trader migration
The competition among specialists is reflected directly by the mi-
gration of intra-marginal traders and extra-marginal trade s. Traders
migrate based on estimates of expected profits, where the estimate
for a given specialist is based on past experience with that special-
ist. Generally speaking, the more intra-marginal traders and the
fewer extra-marginal traders in a market, the more potential profit
there is, and the easier it is to make transactions and achieve a high
transaction success rate. To measure the balance of intra-marginal
and extra-marginal demand and supply, we introduce themarginal





whereDi is the intra-marginal demand — the equilibrium — and
De is the extra-marginal demand. The marginal coefficient for sup-
ply, βS , can be defined similarly.βD varies between 0 and 1. A
value of 0 indicates that all the buyers in the market are extra-
marginal while 1 indicates all the buyers are intra-marginal. Fig-
ure 3(a) shows the daily value ofβD in the individual markets man-
aged by the specialists. SinceβD provides no information on the
absolute equilibrium quantity or profit, Figure 3(b) gives the daily
equilibrium profits in the markets.
As Figure 3(a) shows,βD ≈ 0.5 in all the markets when the
game starts. Then theβD of IAMwildCAT, TacTex, andPSUCAT
increases while that ofCrocodileAgent,PersianCat, andMertacor
decreases. Since a fallingβ indicates losing intra-marginal traders
and/or gaining extra-marginal traders, these changes indicate that
intra-marginal traders and extra-marginal traders have diff rent pref-
erences over the different markets.
Intra-marginal traders seem to be sensitive to matching policies
and charges, especially charges on profit. However, they seem to
be relatively insensitive to other charges so long as they can still
profit from trades. Figure 3(a) shows that theβD of Mertacor,
PersianCat, andCrocodileAgent decreases significantly at the
beginning of the game and remains low all the way through the
game. However these decreases occur for different reasons.
The low allocative efficiency ofMertacor means a great por-
tion of the potential social welfare is not achieved, suggesting an
inefficient matching policy6. A close examination ofMertacor’s
mechanism found that itsMV-like matching policy strategically ex-
ecutes extra-marginal trades so as to increase its transaction suc-
6During theCAT 2007 competition,TacTex and some others announced invalid fees
on some trading days, causing them to be banned from the gamesfor a certain period.
This is equivalent to the use of a very inefficient matching policy. Our experiments
have rounded their fees into the valid ranges and avoided banning the specialists.



































































































(c) Transaction success rate
Figure 1: Scores of specialists in our experiments

















































































(c) Charge on profit.
Figure 2: Daily fees charged by specialists in our experiments.
cess rate, but this leads to much lower profit for the intra-margin l
traders involved in those trades. In addition,Mertacor mistak-
enly disregards the unmatched shouts every time after the market
is cleared. This will then make the traders that made these shout
unable to either improve their standing shouts or place new ones
since the game server believes they still have active shouts. Some
of these traders may possibly be intra-marginal traders, therefore
causing unrealized intra-marginal trades. These two issues provide
sufficient ‘excuse’ for intra-marginal traders to flee.
PersianCat andCrocodileAgent lose traders due to impos-
ing high profit charges.PersianCat charges 100% on profit for
the whole game and this drivesβD down very quickly.Crocodile-
Agent levies a lower fee thanPersianCat and therefore has a
modestly decreasingβD . The decrease ofβD in PSUCAT andjack-
aroo starting from days 250–300 follows an aggressive increase in
the profit fee.
The rest of the specialists have much higherβD despite their use
of similar policies.IAMwildCAT, for instance, though adopting a
version ofMV, refrains from using it in the early rounds of a day,
which usually are sufficient to realize most intra-marginaltr des.
MANX, though levying a high, yet volatile, profit fee, also levies
other fees without bias considerations, which together scare away
both extra-marginal traders and intra-marginal traders atapproxi-
mately the same pace. ItsβD therefore zigzags around 0.5. The
three specialists that obtain aβD higher than 0.6 during the most
time of the game,IAMwildCAT, PSUCAT, andTacTex, all produce
allocative efficiency higher than 85%, again suggesting theimpor-
tance of matching policies in keeping a high-quality traderpopula-
tion.
Registration fees appear to help filter out extra-marginal traders,
and information fees have the same effect onGD and ZIP traders
(which require such information).IAMwildCAT and jackaroo
consistently impose one or both of these fees. As a result, the num-
ber of extra-marginal traders in those markets falls the most.
Shout fees also affect extra-marginal traders, but the degree of
the effect depends on the shout accepting policy used. If theac-
cepting policy is a strong filter and extra-marginal tradershave
little chance to place shouts, they can avoid losing money due to
charges and thus are indifferent to shout charges. Their staying
with a specialist therefore does not harm the market’s transaction
success rate, and on the contrary, only adds to its market share.
TacTex, uniquely among the specialists, charges only shout fees
and consistently does so all the way through the game, as shown
in Figure 2(b). This policy together with itsAA accepting policy
— the weakest one possible — causes the extra-marginal traders to
leave quickly.
Mertacor managed to draw a large number of extra-marginal
traders during the first 200 days, due to its free-market policy. Its
policy change, starting to charge heavily on registration as in Fig-
ure 2(a), explains why it loses almost all its extra-marginal traders
shortly afterwards and itsβ increases significantly around day 200.
Actually, higher registration fees inPSUCAT after day 150 andPer-
sianCat after day 200, are both accompanied with a loss of mar-
ket share in extra-marginal traders.CrocodileAgent increases its





























(a) Daily marginal coefficient of demand,βD




























(b) Daily equilibrium profit
Figure 3: Properties of daily equilibria in individual markets.
registration fee as well around day 200 but the modestly increased
fee is still lower than those charged by most of other specialists,
therefore it is still popular among extra-marginal traders.
In conclusion, extra-marginal traders, as expected, flee from those
markets with high registration fees and information fees (al o high
shout fees as inTacTex) to other markets, while intra-marginal
traders migrate from markets with high profit fees and inefficient
matching policies to those that do not have high charges and real-
ize the most potential social welfare.
4.4 Learning and adaptation in specialists
The numbers of traders registered daily with specialists, profit
made in markets, and their daily charges are all accessible to spe-
cialists viaCATP. This makes it possible for specialists to learn and
adapt their own policies. The transaction success rates however are
unavailable unless a specialist is willing to obtain shout and trans-
action information direct from other specialists, paying ay neces-
sary fees. Specialists’ payments for this purpose are not observable
during the games.
Though specialists may adapt various types of auction policies,
changes in charging policy are more obvious than other aspects
from the data collected.MANX copies the charges of the leading
markets in terms of profit share and market share combined, pro-
ducing the most scattered charges among the specialists through the
games. Looking at its charges gives us an approximate pattern of
adaption of the other markets.
1. At the opening stage,PersianCat charges the most (though
only profit fees) while most of the others are free markets.
2. TacTex then starts to impose shout fees, but its payoff and
winning position is not sustainable. Its market share declin s
significantly as seen in Figure 1(a) around day 20.
3. Around day 50,jackaroo begins to impose all types of fees
heavily, and similarly toTacTex, jackaroo’s market share
decreases. Figure 1(a) shows that before day 50, the free
jackaroo market attracts more and more traders, but after
that, traders flee quickly first and then slowly. Figures 3(a),
3(b), and 1(a) further indicate that intra-marginal traders are
more sensitive and flee faster than extra-marginal traders im-
mediately after day 50, causing a plunge in market share im-
mediately after day 50 and an increasingβ between days 50
and 100. Around day 100,β starts to drop again, suggesting
extra-marginal traders leave at a slower and slower pace and
intra-marginal traders still flee gradually if not even faster.
4. From around day 85,IAMwildCAT disregards its free-market
policy and turns to charge registration fees, as shown in Fig-
ure 2(a), which scares away extra-marginal traders, and Fig-
ure 3(a) shows a significantly faster increase ofβ. PSUCAT
afterwards does the same thing and causes an increasingβ
between days 100 and 150.7
5. IAMwildCAT andjackaroo, are designed to take advantage
of the known length of games. One after another, they in-
crease their charges to much higher levels and make huge
profits during the last days of the games, thoughJCAT has
taken measures to avoid traders going bankrupt in this situ-
ation and disregards any due charge beyond the capabilities
of traders. The huge daily profits obtained, however, did not
greatly increase their final scores since the scoring mecha-
nism adopted byCAT normalizes profits before scoring.
The comparison between the charges ofMANX, which copies charges,
and those of the specialists mentioned above show clearly which
have adapted their policies and become the daily front-runners at
each point.
IAMwildCAT exhibits stable performance according to almost all
criteria and is worth further investigation. Profit share isthe most
sensitive metric since fee changes may immediately and dramat-
ically cause the relative profit shares to go up or down. In Fig-
ure 1(b),TacTex, jackaroo, andPSUCAT, one after another, in-
crease their charges and claim big profit shares. However every
subsequent increase leads to an apparent profit share drop for the
previous front-runner, including whatIAMwildCATdoes toPSUCAT
by increasing its profit charge gradually as shown in Figure 2(c).8
Despite this common theme,IAMwildCAT is to a great extent im-
mune to the changes of other specialists’ charges in terms ofit
profit share. This should be attributed to its target-oriented charg-
ing policy and the direct calculation of fees to achieve a certain tar-
get profit.Mertacor takes a similar approach, but its sub-optimal
calculation method and other problematic auction rules prevent the
approach from working well.
7The y axis in Figure 2(a) has an upper bound of 2, and does not show the constant
registration charges of 10 byPSUCAT in the second half of the game. This aims to
obtain a better general view, avoiding the curves of other spcialists (usually below
2) being squeezed together and approaching the x axis. The even higher charges by
the specialists near the end of the game, due to the same reason, are not shown in
Figures 2(a)-2(c).
8The increase of shout fees inTacTex around day 300 may also play a role in
loweringPSUCAT’s profit share.
5. DISCUSSION
Here we extract some general guidance for market design from
the analysis above.
5.1 ME vs. MV
If a high transaction success rate is desirable, then specialists
have to explicitly take this into account, for example by matching
intra-marginal and extra-marginal shouts, just asMV does. How-
ever, caution should be exercised when using anMV-like policy. MV
may cause intra-marginal traders to lose profits and in a competi-
tive situation may lead them to prefer non-MV markets. This is ex-
actly what happened toMertacor. In addition, the extra-marginal
trades may lower market efficiency.IAMwildCAT’s matching pol-
icy is a mixture ofME and aMV-like policy. It uses the former in
the first rounds of a day and the latter in the rest of the day. Fig-
ure 1(c) shows thatIAMwildCAT obtains high transaction success
rates, very close or equal to 100%, after day 150 when the specialist
starts to use theMV-like policy for more rounds in a day. As a con-
sequence,IAMwildCAT’s efficiency has a striking 5% drop. Un-
like Mertacor, IAMwildCAT did not show a loss of intra-marginal
traders when it did this. This is because most of the intra-margin l
traders traded in the early rounds of each day — when theMV-
like policy was used, most of the traders still shouting wereextra-
marginal traders, few shouts made by these traders can pass the
specialist’s shout accepting policy, and these limited extra-marginal
shouts did no great harm to the remaining intra-marginal traders.
Since traders are profit-seeking,MV-like policies can actually in-
crease market allocative efficiency in some cases. For instance,
a greedy intra-marginal trader may make an extra-marginal shout,
which, whenME is used, will not be matched and therefore add
to the number of unrealized intra-marginal trades. WhenMV is
used, this extra-marginal shout can be matched by an intra-marginal
trader, and the efficiency loss can thus be reduced or avoided.
5.2 Open vs. closed shout accepting
Shout accepting policies have a direct impact on the effectiv ness
of other auction rules. An open shout accepting policy places a
heavy burden on the matching policy. When the matching policy
is also ineffective, intra-marginal traders fail to profit and tend to
leave. In contrast, if the shout accepting policy filters outmost
extra-marginal shouts, a simple matching policy can work well.
For example,CrocodileAgent andPersianCat have similar
trader populations in terms of their competitiveness, as shown in
Figures 4(a) and 3(a), and both use theME matching policy. How-
ever, they produce significantly different shout sets as shown in Fig-
ure 4(b) and transaction success rates as illustrated in Figure 1(c).
This is due to theAE accepting policy inCrocodileAgent, which
is much more effective than the policy inPersianCat.
In addition, AQ, the common accepting policy, may leave the
door wide-open at the start of a day. InCAT games, shouts auto-
matically expire at the end of a day. This resets the market quotes
in AQ and loses valuable information from the previous day on
the underlying demand and supply schedules, which do not usually
change dramatically over days. This may explain whyjackaroo
andMANX, the twoAQ markets, with higher mean theoretical de-
mand prices in Figure 4(a) than those inCrocodileAgent, pro-
duce bid sets with lower mean prices as in Figure 4(b) and lower
transaction success rates.
We believe a good accepting policy in the currentCAT game set-
ting should be able to reflect the collective properties of traders and
carry this knowledge from day to day, as the history-based policy
AH does. We expect that most specialists would be better off when
usingAH. PSUCAT’s customizedAE is another potential policy. The






































(a) Underlying demand, as calculated from trader pri-
vate values.

































(b) Reported demand, as calculated from shouts.
Figure 4: Daily mean demand prices.
mean theoretical demand price in thePSUCATmarket jumps around
day 100 in Figure 4(a), andβD follows in Figure 3(a), but this did
not cause the mean bid price to climb as well, indicating the effec-
tiveness of its shout accepting policy, which successfullyprevented
extra-marginal traders placing shouts.
5.3 Market share vs. profits
In CAT games it is common for specialists to find that increasing
fees will boost profits but gradually lead to loss of market share.
If market share falls too low, the profit return cannot be sustained.
In contrast, low charges help gain market shares but harm profits.
However, if a charging policy is properly designed, it may keep
both measures at suitably high levels. Imposing small, flat,fees
after a game has been running for a while, may not have much neg-
ative effect on market shares if the good reputation of a specialist
has been established and the traders continue to make profit that is
much higher than the fees. In this way, on the basis of a big market
share, small fees may still bring a considerable amount of prfit.
IAMwildCAT demonstrates this.
Bias towards different types of fees in charging policies can also
benefit specialists. For example,IAMwildCAT andPSUCAT use reg-
istration fees to drive extra-marginal traders away, make it easy for
the trader population to find partners, and obtain high transaction
success rates. However as discussed in Section 4.3, a powerful
shout accepting policy may make this unnecessary or even harm-
ful, since it may filter out most extra-marginal shouts and avoid
their negative effect on transaction success rates. With a strong ac-
cepting policy and without charges on registration and information,
a market actually becomes a free place for extra-marginal traders to
stay. If other markets impose these charges, these traders are sure
to be willing to stay with this free market and boost market share.
5.4 Targeted vs. non-targeted charges
Specialists in the tournament adapt their daily charges differently
(Table 2). Some do this by setting specific performance targes,
determining these targets from estimates of the expected actions
of other specialists, while others increase or decrease their cur-
rent charges without setting targets or modeling the effectof the
changes.IAMwildCAT, for instance, determines a reasonable por-
tion of the profit it desires to make via registration fees, and calcu-
lates its registration fee and profit fee by taking into consideration
the average profit a trader has been able to make in its market.In
contrast, parameter values and charge levels of most other special-
ists are decided rather arbitrarily. As a result,IAMwildCAT has a
stable performance in the face of changes by other specialists.
Several specialists are reactive, copying the fees that other, well-
performing, specialists charge.MANX in particular does this. This
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, it is usually based
on a short-term assessment and may not optimize the long-term
outcome. Second, copying a winning specialist may not be a win-
ning strategy. The effect of fees is closely related to otherauction
rules of specialists and the properties of their trader population at
that moment [11].MANX’s follow-the-leader approach demonstrates
impressive performance during the early part of a game when t
trader populations in all individual markets are quite similar. How-
ever it fails to lead to a similar outcome after traders have di rged
to prefer different markets.
6. SUMMARY
This paper provides an analysis of the entrants in the 2007TAC
Market Design competition. We believe that it makes three main
contributions to the literature of electronic markets.
First, this paper provides a more extensive assessment of the per-
formance of the entrants to the 2007 competition than was posible
in the competition itself. Each game runs for around 8 hours,and
given the technical problems experienced by both organizers and
competitors, this meant that it was only possible to run two games
during the three days of the competition, and not all of thesein-
volved all the competitors. Running more games and including
all the competitors gives more definitive results, and confirms the
dominance ofIAMwildCAT.
Second, this paper provides the first classification of the strate-
gies used by 2007 Market Design competition entrants, and the first
comparison of the effects of these strategies in a rigorous,system-
atic experiment. While there are many more experiments to berun
before we fully understand the comparative strengths of thes rate-
gies, we believe that these aspects of the paper will be of help to
future entrants in the competition.
Third, the paper provides a discussion of the implications of the
design of the various components of double auction mechanisms,
in particular the interaction between the component policies, and
their effect on auction performance. We hope that this part of the
paper will help to guide future research on the design of double
auctions, not least in suggesting new market designs that involve
new combinations of component policies.
Of course, there are limits on what this analysis tells us. Since
the results are likely, as are all market games of this complexity, to
depend heavily on the population of participants, the conclusions
we draw here are only valid in the context of the specialist and
trader populations we experimented with. To obtain more robust
results, we need to carry out the kind of empirical game-theoretic
analysis presented in [8], and we are currently working on this.
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